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Abstract
We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To
do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of
heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data extrac-
tion entails a privacy cost for users. We show that both the firm and users prefer the
users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the
robustness of our results to allowing more possible contracts for the data owner. We
show that the main trade-off between the two ownership regimes is robust to these
extensions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The new business landscape has made online-generated data one of the most important
assets for some companies. Indeed, technological giants such as Google and Facebook
owe their success to the collection, processing and monetization of the data generated via
their interactions with consumers. By default, companies control all generated data, and
concerns over the optimality of this arrangement have arisen in public discourse over
time.1 Importantly, such concerns are relevant not only to consumers but also equally to
firms that benefit from monetizing personal data.2 Indeed, because any direct gains from
data monetization are usually mitigated by consumers’ privacy concerns, it is unclear
whether firms could earn higher profits if consumers (instead of firms) directly controlled
and monetized the generated data.
The concerns related to consumer privacy and the importance of establishing clear
property rights on data are exemplified by the recent open letter by Business Roundtable
CEOs to congressional leaders.3 In this letter, CEOs of leading companies, such as Ama-
zon’s Jeff Bezos, IBM’s Ginni Rometty, and Best Buy’s Corie Barry, urged policymakers
to urgently pass “...a comprehensive federal consumer data privacy law to strengthen consumer
trust and establish a stable policy environment in which new services and technologies can flour-
ish within a well-understood legal and regulatory framework. Innovation thrives under clearly
1See among others: “Should Consumers Be Able to Sell Their Own Personal Data?”, Wall Street Journal,
13 Oct 2019; “We need to own our data as a human right”and be compensated for it”, the Economist, Open
Future, Jan 21, 2019; “Draining Data Moats: What Happens When Consumers Take Control Of Their Own
Data?”, Forbes, 21 Aug 2019.
2As early as the 1990s, Laudon (1996) and Hagel III and Rayport (1997) set the ground for the debate
on the ownership of data. For instance, Laudon (1996) advocates that consumers should own their data
and that market mechanisms should be established to prevent privacy invasion. Furthermore, Hagel III
and Rayport (1997) argue that as the information collected by firms becomes more valuable, consumers
will demand a share of the generated value, and firms should be ready to enter into costly and complex
negotiations with them. More recently, Berinato (2014) proposes a “New Deal” for data where he argues
that allowing customers to own their data “...gives customers a stake in the new data economy; that will
bring first greater stability and then eventually greater profitability as people become more comfortable
sharing data.”
3See for instance “Business Roundtable CEOs Call on Congress to Pass Comprehensive, Nationwide
Consumer Data Privacy Law”, Business Round Table, September 10, 2019
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defined and consistently applied rules.” Elsewhere in the letter, the CEOs state that “We are
also united in our belief that consumers should have meaningful rights over their personal infor-
mation and that companies that access this information should be held consistently accountable
under a comprehensive federal consumer data privacy law.”
As a response to the ever-increasing concerns related to consumer privacy, recent
regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) provide individuals with more control over their data.
Nonetheless, the current state of the law does not directly address the question of own-
ership, and firms and regulators circumvent many of the obstacles by avoiding direct
references to ownership; instead, they focus on the potential controls exercised by a data
subject or the limitations of a data controller (see Ritter and Mayer, 2017).4 In short, the
legal and other difficulties in defining data ownership notwithstanding, investigating the
impact of the different legal statuses of data on firms’ profits and consumers’ welfare is a
relevant debate everywhere.
Model Preview.—To study this question, we develop a simple two-period model in
which a monopolistic firm (a website in many cases) interacts with a set of heterogeneous
consumers (users). The firm offers a service and sets subscription fees that consumers
need to pay to access the provided service. The fees consumers pay depend on their
usage, and a consumer’s type determines the combination of fee and usage that the con-
sumer prefers. Key to our analysis is that usage in the first period generates data that
can be exploited in the second period. We model this through a parameter that permits
a stark characterization of the effect of changes in the value of data on market outcomes.
4The GDPR defines rights such as the need for informed consent, the right to access and extract data,
the right to be forgotten, and some duties for data holders and controllers. In theory, the GDPR seems to
considerably restrict the use of data; in practice, the GDPR does not strictly prevent firms from processing
data. Indeed, Article 6 of the GDPR offers a particularly subjective assessment of the lawfulness of process-
ing data (see Duch-Brown, Martens, and Mueller-Langer, 2017). Article 6 states, among other things, that
the processing of data is lawful if it ”... is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.”.
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Although data generates value that can be monetized, the collection and processing of
data entails a privacy cost for users. We define property rights as the ability to control the
amount of data collected and processed.
Results Preview.—As a benchmark, we first characterize the firm’s profit-maximizing
offer to consumers when data extraction is contractible. We show that the firm offers
a usage schedule that is increasing in the consumer’s type and prefers to monetize all
data for relatively low-value consumers but only part of the data for relatively high-value
consumers. This result stems from the fact that for low-value consumers, the cost of
privacy is low and hence the firm can afford to monetize all data without sufficiently
distorting usage; for high-value consumers, the cost of privacy is high, which restricts the
amount of data monetization.
Having characterized the firm’s profit-maximizing offer when data extraction is con-
tractible, we then turn to the characterization of the firm’s profit-maximizing offers when
data extraction is not contractible and one of the two sides is allocated ownership rights
over the generated data. In particular, we assume that the party that owns the rights is
unable to commit ex ante to an ex post level of data extraction and monetization.
If the firm owns the rights, it has full control over the collection and processing of
the data of all users.5 Users rationally anticipate that any information generated in the
first period will be monetized in the second period. As a result, the firm’s optimal offer
entails low usage for all consumers, a distortion that is independent of the value of data.
The firm’s offer entails lower usage and more data extraction for relatively high-value
consumers compared with the case in which data extraction is contractible. For relatively
low-value consumers, usage and data extraction are the same as in the benchmark.
If users own the rights, they have full control over the collection and processing of
5As we argued above—and in light of recent regulations—in reality there are limits to the amount of
data firms can extract. Nonetheless, consumers’ limited understanding of how data is collected and used
blurs these limits. For instance, Chakravorti (2020) provides compelling arguments of what has come to be
known as a “privacy paradox”: users’ strong privacy concerns are not reflected in their online behavior.
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their data. Nonetheless, we assume that the value consumers can earn by monetizing
their data is lower than the value the firm can earn when it owns the rights. This dis-
counted value may be the consequence of some underlying moral hazard: when firms do
not directly manage the data, they are less motivated to exploit the data’s potential. The
firm’s profit-maximizing usage offer and the consumers’ optimal data monetization pol-
icy resemble those when data extraction is contractible. Consumers with low willingness
to pay prefer to monetize all their data; consumers with high willingness to pay monetize
only part of their data. Nonetheless, relative to the case in which data extraction is con-
tractible, the firm’s offer entails lower usage for relatively low-value consumers but equal
usage for high-value consumers. Regarding the consumers’ data monetization policy,
data extraction remains everywhere lower than in the benchmark due to the consumers’
limited ability to exploit the data’s full potential in the data market.
We compare the welfare in the two ownership regimes. We demonstrate that, for
relatively low (high) values of data, both the firm and users prefer the consumers (firm) to
own the rights. Intuitively, for relatively low values of data, the firm does not experience
large gains by monetizing the data, but users suffer the cost of privacy; hence, the cost
of distorted usage offsets the gains from monetizing the data. By contrast, for relatively
high values of data, the firm is willing to compensate the users to opt for high usage; the
resulting decrease in subscription fees, alongside the high value of data, offsets the cost
of privacy.
Model Extensions.—We extend the baseline model in two directions. First, we study
the possibility that, when the firm owns the rights, it offers to let consumers pay for their
privacy. This is equivalent to allowing the firm to sell two types of good as is commonly
observed in practice: (i) a good that provides access only to the service while leaving all
rights from data generation to the firm; and (ii) a good that provides access to the service
and prevents further usage of the data generated in the first place. Indeed, we show that
the firm’s profit-maximizing offer entails low usage with full data extraction for low-value
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consumers and high usage with no data extraction for high-value consumers.
We demonstrate that the option for privacy increases both the firm’s profit and con-
sumers’ welfare relative to the regime in which no such option is available. We then
compare this regime with the regime in which consumers own the rights. We show that
when consumers are unable to earn any money from monetizing their data, the option
for privacy increases both the firm’s profit and consumers’ welfare relative to the regime
in which consumers own the rights. When consumers can monetize their data (albeit im-
perfectly), the option for privacy leads to a higher profit and consumer surplus as long as
the value of data is sufficiently high.
Second, we consider the case in which consumers can only decide whether to sell their
entire dataset at a uniform price instead of fine-tuning the amount and type of data they
sell. This is conceptually equivalent to a situation according to which there is a market for
privacy and consumers can sell to third parties the right to use their data. In this case, we
show that the firm’s profit is lower relative to the case in which consumers can select how
much data to sell. Nonetheless, we also show that consumers earn exactly the surplus
they could earn if they could fine-tune the amount and type of data they sell.
Paper Outline.—In the next subsection, we discuss the related literature. In Section 2,
we present the model. In Section 3, we study the firm’s profit-maximizing usage and data
extraction offer when data extraction is contractible. In Section 4, we assume that data
extraction is not contractible and compare welfare when the firm owns the rights with
that when consumers own the rights and derive our central trade-off. In Section 5, we
discuss various extensions of our model. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are
relegated to an appendix at the end of the paper.
A. Related Literature
Our work builds on the literature that studies the effect of property rights on economic al-
locations. Following Coase (1960) (or, more formally, Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin,
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1979), it is well known that when the firm’s contracting possibility set is large enough,
property rights are irrelevant for economic allocations. This is indeed the case in our
model when data extraction is contractible (Section 3). This leads us to consider some
contractual incompleteness — in particular the inability to commit ex ante to the inten-
sity of data extraction and monetization — to make a meaningful comparison between
different property rights regimes. In our model, as in Grossman and Hart (1986), prop-
erty rights are defined as residual control rights.
Our contribution is also related, albeit imperfectly, to the literature on privacy. Her-
malin and Katz (2006) links privacy to the right to (i) compel information disclosure or (ii)
conceal information. They show that, with complete contracts, the outcome is the same
in both cases. The authors also show that more or less privacy may benefit or harm con-
sumers. Unlike our paper, in which the information revealed in one market is potentially
used in other markets, in Hermalin and Katz (2006), there is a unique market. In this
sense, our paper is related to the literature on dynamic pricing on the internet (Acquisti,
2006) or the impact of information on market outcomes (Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman,
2016).
Jones and Tonetti (2018) is the article most closely related to the research question pur-
sued here. They develop a dynamic general equilibrium growth model in which the data
are a by-product of consumption. Each unit of data can be used not only by the firm that
generated it but also by other firms through a market in which the firm can sell its data.
When firms control the data, they tend to limit data sharing in fear of increased competi-
tion; when consumers own their data, they restrict data sharing due to the privacy cost.
The authors emphasize the non-rivalrous aspect of data and the gains for growth when
consumers control their data. Our approach focuses on the role of ownership over the
amount of data created through its impact on the contract between firms and consumers.
In other words, we are more interested in the consequences of the allocation of owner-
ship on the firm’s and consumer’s strategies than in the general ex post consequences for
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economic efficiency.
Finally, our setting relates to the literature on standard two-sided markets (Rochet and
Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). Indeed, the firm in our model is reminiscent of a platform,
although we mostly analyze the interaction of the platform with one side of the market
(the firm with consumers). Nevertheless, one can see how the pricing strategy on one
side (e.g., the number of users, price of the service) changes when the value of data on the
other side increases.
2 THE MODEL
A. Agents
We consider a bilateral relationship between a firm and a unit mass of consumers. The
firm provides a service, and each consumer decides her consumption level q ≥ 0. One can
regard q as the intensity of usage or the time a consumer spends on the website; hence, for
future convenience, we refer to q as usage and assume throughout that this is contractible.
Crucial in what follows is that consumers differ in their valuations of usage. In particular,
the gross utility of a consumer from usage q is given by u(θ, q) = θq − q2/2, where θ
denotes the type of consumer. We assume that θ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].6 We
further assume that θ is a consumer’s private information and that the outside option of
every consumer is zero.7
B. Data Extraction: Benefits and Costs
Benefits.—A specific feature of our model is that usage in one period generates valuable
data that can be exploited in subsequent periods. In dynamic frameworks, the way agents
6Note that all the results of the benchmark case and section extend to the general distribution function.
It is necessary to assume a uniform distribution to derive some results in the extensions. More details are
provided in the appendix.
7Because the firm is a monopolist, we consider a context in which there is uncertainty regarding some
of the characteristics of the consumers. This guarantees that part of the gains from trade are captured by
consumers. An alternative but somewhat equivalent approach would be to have a unique offer for all
potential consumers.
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interact in one period affects their behavior in subsequent periods (Fudenberg and Tirole,
2000). Such potential dynamics have been at the center of recent discussions on the eco-
nomics of the internet (Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Fudenberg and Villas-Boas, 2012). In
this paper, we assume that the interaction between the firm and consumers generates
potential informational value. The net informational value that is generated from data
extraction is given by B(e, α) = αe, where e ≥ 0 is the amount of data extracted and
α ≥ 0 measures the importance of the market for data (the secondary market) relative to
the market for the service provided by the firm (the primary market). The latter can fur-
ther depend on the intensity of competition in the market for data — that is, the extent to
which the information generated by the service substitutes or complements information
owned by other firms. We assume that there is a technological constraint on the amount
of data extracted in that this cannot exceed the amount of generated data. Formally, we
require that e ≤ q.
Costs.—Another key element of our model is that, although data extraction creates
value, it is costly for consumers. There are at least two relevant categories of costs related
to data extraction. The first category includes every cost related to the loss of privacy
that accompanies the use of personal data. These psychological costs are a consequence
of a pure preference for privacy and are therefore independent of economic outcomes
(Westin, 1967). The second category is related to the economic impact that data extraction
has on the secondary market, particularly the possibility of finest price discrimination
using personal data. We summarize these two costs in a single function and assume that
when e is extracted and monetized, a consumer suffers disutility equal to C(e, α) = ce2/2,
where c > 0.
We further assume that α ≤ c. This assumption creates a potential trade-off between
different ownership regimes and renders the problem salient. In particular, this assump-
tion implies that (i) when data extraction is contractible, it is not optimal to extract and
monetize all data for all consumers, and (ii) when data extraction is not contractible, the
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optimal allocation of rights is not trivial.
Discussion.—Our specifications of the benefit and cost of data extraction imply that the
net value of data is strictly concave in e. We must admit that it remains an open question
whether the net value of data exhibits increasing or decreasing returns to scale. Regarding
the value, if one considers classical Bayesian updating, changes in decisions are more
likely for the first than the last signals received. If we interpret e as pieces of information,
it seems natural to assume that the benefits are concave (Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb,
2018). Although the linearity assumption simplifies the analysis, most our results extend
to the case of strictly concave benefits. It is unclear whether privacy costs are convex or
concave in the information revealed. Regarding price discrimination, one might expect
that the marginal impact of information is decreasing and thus that concavity prevails. By
contrast, the psychological cost can be either concave — if an agent suffers more during
the first breaches of privacy — or convex — if she suffers only when very precise and
intimate information is discovered. Nevertheless, most papers (as in Jones and Tonetti,
2018) assume that this cost is convex, and we follow their lead by imposing the same
assumption.8
3 CONTRACTIBLE DATA EXTRACTION BENCHMARK
As a benchmark, in this section, we consider the firm’s profit-maximizing offer by assum-
ing that data extraction is contractible. In this case, the firm can commit to the amount of
data that will be extracted. At this stage, we do not consider questions related to owner-
ship; in fact, ownership is irrelevant for the firm’s maximum profit and consumer surplus.
The Firm’s Optimal Offer.—To characterize the firm’s profit-maximizing offer, we focus
without loss of generality on direct revelation mechanisms. This means that the inter-
action between the consumers and the firm is modelled as a game in which consumers
8Note that when the net value is convex, the data extraction policy is different, but the main trade-off
between the firm owning the rights and consumer owning the rights remains unaltered. What will be
crucial is the fact that there can be over-monetization of data in the first case and under-monetization in the
other case.
10
truthfully report their type and a pre-defined price-usage-data extraction triplet is imple-
mented as a function of the report (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002 for details).
Let a mechanism be denoted by (t(·), q(·), e(·)). The indirect utility of type θ from
truthfully announcing her type is given by
U(θ) = θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2− t(θ)− C(q(θ)) (1)
Using standard techniques in information economics, one can show that the mechanism is
incentive compatible only if usage is non-decreasing in θ and U˙(θ) = q(θ). By integrating
the latter condition, one obtains that
U(θ) = U(0) +
∫ θ
0
q(τ)dτ (2)
This expression represents the share of the surplus that must be left to type θ to truthfully
reveal her type. The firm therefore has incentives to minimize this amount. As the payoff
is increasing in θ, the firm will bind the participation constraint of the lowest type — that
is, U(0) = 0.
The profit of the firm consists of the sum of the transfers it collects from consumers
and the benefit from data monetization.9 Therefore, the firm’s profit is equal to∫ 1
0
(
t(θ) +B(α, e(θ))
)
dθ
which, by using (1), can be rewritten as∫ 1
0
[
θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2 +B(α, e(θ))− C(e(θ))− U(θ)
]
dθ
If one substitutes (2) and employs the fact that U(0) = 0, the profit is given by∫ 1
0
[
θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2 +B(α, e(θ))− C(e(θ))−
∫ θ
0
q(τ)dτ
]
dθ
9Although irrelevant for the results, we assume here that the firm owns the data. If consumers owned
the data, the firm could appropriate the generated surplus by offering higher fees.
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which, provided that
∫ 1
0
( ∫ θ
0
q(τ)dτ
)
dθ = (1− θ)q(θ), can be rewritten as∫ 1
0
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2 +B(α, e(θ))− C(e(θ))
]
dθ
It is convenient to let
φ(q) = max
e≤q
B(α, e)− C(e) (3)
represent the maximum net value that is generated in the secondary market when usage
in the first period is equal to q. For notational simplicity, we further let e¯∗ = α/c denote
the data that maximizes B(α, ·) − C(·) when e < q. Function φ(q) is strictly increasing in
q for q < e¯∗ and constant for q ≥ e¯∗. By using (3), one can write the profit as∫ 1
0
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2 + φ(q(θ))
]
dθ (4)
The firm’s objective then is to select a usage schedule q(·) to maximize (4) subject
to monotonicity (usage is non-decreasing) and feasibility (usage is positive for every θ)
constraints. Therefore, provided that type θ purchases (i.e., q(θ) ≥ 0), the optimal usage
schedule is implicitly defined by
q(θ) = (2θ − 1) + φ′(q(θ)) (5)
For high values of data, the marginal cost of privacy exceeds the marginal benefits from
monetizing data. This implies that there is a maximum amount of data that should be
monetized. For the low-usage consumers, the marginal benefit of monetization always
exceeds the marginal privacy cost, and all data is monetized; for the high-usage con-
sumers, the marginal benefit of monetization does not always exceed the marginal pri-
vacy cost, and only part of the data is monetized.
We summarize the firm’s profit-maximizing offer in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. There exists θˆ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the firm’s profit-maximizing usage offer q∗(·)
is given by
q∗(θ) =
{
max{q1(θ), 0}, if θ < θˆ∗
q0(θ), if θ ≥ θˆ∗
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where q1(θ) = (2θ − 1 + α)/(1 + c) and q0(θ) = 2θ − 1
Moreover, the firm’s profit-maximizing data extraction policy e∗(·) is given by
e∗(θ) =
{
max{q1(θ), 0}, if θ < θˆ∗
e¯∗, if θ ≥ θˆ∗
In the firm’s profit-maximizing usage offer and data extraction policy, a trade-off be-
tween maximizing usage and extracting data arises. For high-value consumers, higher
usage is preferred to data extraction; for low-value consumers, the opposite holds. This
explains the different usage policies (i.e., q1(·) and q0(·)).
Comparative Statics.—Let the cut-off below which no type buys the service be denoted
by θ1 = max{0, (1 − α)/2}.10 By inspection, one can see that θ1 is decreasing in α and
that q1(·) is increasing in α for every θ. When α increases, the firm (i) trades with more
consumers and (ii) offers more usage to all of the consumers with whom it trades. The
first result is reminiscent of two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Caillaud and
Jullien, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). Indeed, in a standard two-sided market, an increase in
the potential value on one side of the market is accompanied by an increase in the size of
the other side. In our case, the higher the value in the secondary market, the stronger the
firm’s incentive to accommodate a larger share of consumers in the primary market.
A last interesting remark is that whenever α > 1, θ1 = 0. In fact, the optimal mecha-
nism may entail subsidization of consumers to join the website and generate data. Intu-
itively, when data is very valuable and the firm owns the rights, the firm has an incentive
to attract as many consumers as possible. Because low types have low (or at the limit
no) willingness to pay for the service, the only way to attract customers is by subsidizing
them.11
10Formally, q1(θ1) = 0 and q1(θ) > 0 if and only if θ > θ1.
11This result is related to Amelio and Jullien (2012), who identify problems and propose solutions regard-
ing the subsidization of consumers in two-sided markets.
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4 NON-CONTRACTIBLE DATA EXTRACTION: FIRM’S RIGHT VS. CONSUMER’S RIGHT
In this section, we assume that data extraction is not contractible and investigate the eco-
nomic consequences of allocating the rights to one of the two sides of the market. We
say that we are in a firm’s right regime when the firm owns the exclusive rights over
any generated data. As we explained in the introduction, this is the regime that de facto
prevails in most developed countries. Indeed, although recent regulations (e.g., GDPR,
CCPA) restrict data extraction and monetization, it is still natural to consider firm’s right
as the status quo. Nonetheless, we assume that the firm is unable to commit to a data ex-
traction policy simply because data extraction is non-contractible. As the polar extreme,
we say that we are in a consumer’s right regime when consumers have the right over any
generated data. As is the case in the firm’s right regime, we assume that consumers are
unable to commit to a data extraction policy but can manage their data directly in the data
market.
In either case, we characterize the profit-maximizing offer and, under consumer’s
right, the consumers’ ex post optimal data monetization policy.
A. Firm’s Right
As in the contractible data-extraction benchmark, the firm can offer different contracts
that condition the price paid on usage.12 Nevertheless, we assume that the firm cannot
commit to a data extraction policy. Given that data extraction is costless for the firm, the
firm extracts and monetizes all the generated data from all of its customers. Consequently,
in what follows, we take e = q. Rationally expecting this, type θ knows that for usage
q ≥ 0, her gross utility is given by θq − q2/2− C(q).
The Firm’s Optimal Offer.—Let (t(·), q(·)) denote the contract offered to consumers.
Then, the indirect utility of type θ from truthfully announcing her type is as in (1). The
12If the firm can only offer a fixed contract, the main features that appear below are preserved, albeit in
different form.
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expected profit of the firm is given by
ΠF =
∫ 1
0
[
t(θ) +B(α, q(θ))
]
dθ,
which, by analogy to the benchmark, is equal to
ΠF =
∫ 1
0
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2 +B(α, q(θ))− C(q(θ))
]
dθ (6)
Therefore, the objective of the firm is to select a usage schedule q(·) to maximize (6) sub-
ject to monotonicity (usage is non-decreasing) and feasibility (usage is positive for every
θ) constraints. Whenever type θ purchases, the first-order condition from profit maxi-
mization leads to an optimal usage given by q1(θ) for every θ. This usage schedule is
increasing in θ; therefore, this schedule satisfies the (second-order) incentive compatibil-
ity condition. For notational simplicity, let the firm’s maximum profit in this regime be
denoted by
ΠF =
∫ 1
θ1
[
(2θ − 1)q1(θ)− q21(θ)/2 +B(α, q1(θ))− C(q1(θ))
]
dθ (7)
Inefficiencies.—For high-value consumers, usage is strictly lower when data extraction
is not contractible and the firm owns the rights than in the contractible data-extraction
benchmark; for low-value consumers, there is no inefficiency in usage relative to the con-
tractible data-extraction benchmark. In addition to the usage distortion, a second source
of inefficiency relative to the contractible data-extraction benchmark concerns the over-
utilization of data by the firm. Indeed, the inability of the firm to commit to data extrac-
tion leads the firm to monetize ex post even data that generates negative net value. Since
this is anticipated ex ante, it induces an additional downward distortion in the usage
schedule for high-value consumers. This distortion is exacerbated the more important
privacy is for consumers (the higher the c).
B. Consumer’s Right
Presentation.—We now consider the case in which the consumers directly manage their
data in the data market. Until recently, the idea of consumers directly accessing the data
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market seemed unrealistic. Indeed, given that firms de facto own and manage all online
data, most consumers lack the knowledge and expertise to directly negotiate with data
brokers. Nonetheless, platforms such as www.people.io, datacoup.com or wibson.org
currently offer tools that help users obtain part of the financial returns generated by their
data in exchange for a fee.13 For instance, Wibson states in its mission that “Wibson aims
to level the playing field for all participants in the data ecosystem. We provide infrastructure to
control your data and to choose who to share it with, without sacrificing personal privacy.” It is
also reasonable to assume that if consumers were indeed allocated the rights over their
data, this industry would further flourish because data brokers would have an incen-
tive to directly negotiate with consumers, who would be much better equipped for such
negotiations.
In this section, it is assumed that consumers own the rights and can negotiate with
data brokers. Nonetheless, when a consumer owns the rights, the value she can obtain
from monetizing data is lower than the value the firm can obtain. The idea is that the
firm adds some tangible or non-tangible value to the data through its data analytics. To
model this, we assume that if e is extracted and monetized, the value is equal to δB(α, e)
instead of B(α, e), where δ ∈ [0, 1] represents the discount factor. For δ = 0, the data has
no market value if it is managed directly by consumers; for δ = 1, consumers can directly
manage their data in the secondary market as well as the firm can.
The Consumers’ Optimal Data Monetization Policy.—As in the contractible data-extraction
benchmark, to characterize the optimal contract offered by the firm, we let
φδ(q) = max
e≤q
δB(α, e)− C(e)
represent the maximum net value that a consumer can reap in the market for data if
her usage is equal to q. For notational simplicity, we further let e¯δ = δα/c denote the
(unconstrained) amount of data that maximizes the net value of data. Note that for δ = 1,
13See among others “As of Today, European Consumers Can Profit From Selling Their Own Personal
Data”, Forbes October 11th 2018
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e¯∗ = e¯δ. As in the contractible data-extraction benchmark policy, φδ(·) is strictly increasing
in q for q < e¯δ and constant for q ≥ e¯δ.
The Firm’s Optimal Offer.—If the firm offers a contract (t(·), q(·)), a consumer of type θ
selects an optimal data extraction e (lower than q) to maximize φδ(·). The ex ante utility of
type θ, conditional on this anticipated decision, is
U(θ) = θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2 + φδ(q)− t(θ) (8)
As in the firm’s right regime, to satisfy the incentive constraint, the contract proposed by
the firm must be such that usage is non-decreasing in θ and U˙(θ) = q(θ).
Taking into consideration the incentive and participation constraints, the expected
profit of the firm is simply given by the sum of the payment of all its customers, that
is
∫ 1
0
t(θ)dθ. Therefore, by using (8), the firm’s profit can be rewritten as
ΠC =
∫ 1
0
[
θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2 + φδ(q(θ))− U(θ)
]
dθ
which, by analogy to the contractible data-extraction benchmark, is equal to
ΠC =
∫ 1
0
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2 + φδ(q(θ))
]
dθ (9)
This expression reflects the fact that the firm can incorporate in the price set in the primary
market any additional value consumers can earn in the secondary market. The objective
of the firm is to find a usage schedule that maximizes (9). The optimal usage schedule
and data monetization policies of the firm and consumers, respectively, are characterized
in the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that consumers own the rights. Then, there exists θˆC such that the firm offers
a contract that entails usage q(θ) where
q∗(θ) =
{
max{0, qδ(θ)} if θ < θˆC , with qδ(θ) = (2θ − 1 + δα)/(1 + c)
q0(θ) if θ ≥ θˆC
Moreover, consumers in [0, θˆC ] monetize all their data, whereas consumers in (θˆC , 1] monetize
only e¯δ data.
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The advantage of having consumers directly manage their data in the data market is
the flexibility to monetize only part instead of all of their data. Recall that in the regime
in which the firm owns the rights, its inability to commit to a data extraction policy pre-
cludes such partial monetization. This flexibility creates an added value both for the firm
and the consumers. Note that the cut-off type θˆC is chosen by the firm in its design of the
offer (t(·), q(·)). Since the value generated on the market for data for this consumer is the
same regardless of the usage schedule chosen, the first-period profit for this consumer is
also the same with both usage schedules. We can then write the maximum profit the firm
as
ΠC =
∫ θˆC
θδ
[
(2θ − 1)qδ(θ)− q2δ (θ)/2 +B(α, qδ(θ))− C(qδ(θ))
]
dθ
+
∫ 1
θˆC
[
(2θ − 1)q0(θ)− q20(θ)/2
]
dθ (10)
Comparative Statics.—Let the cut-off type below which no consumer buys the service
be denoted by θδ = max{0, (1 − δα)/2}.14 As is the case when the firm owns the rights,
(i) θδ is decreasing in α and δ, and (ii) qδ(θ) is increasing in α and δ for every θ ≤ θˆδ. For
δ < 1, θδ ≥ θ1, with strict inequality for α < 1. In other words, fewer consumers buy
the service when consumers own the rights relative to the case in which the firm owns
the rights. Because the firm cannot extract value from the data but only indirectly from
the fee it charges, it has less incentives to offer large production schedules or subsidize
consumption. As a result, fewer consumers decide to purchase.
Inefficiencies.—For any δ < 1, low-value consumers’ usage is lower when data extrac-
tion is not contractible and consumers have the right relative to the contractible data-
extraction benchmark, whereas high-value consumers’ usage is equal to that in the con-
tractible data-extraction benchmark. Regarding the data extraction policies, data extrac-
tion is always lower when data extraction is not contractible and consumers have the
right relative to the contractible data-extraction benchmark. This result stems from the
14Formally, qδ(θδ) = 0 and qδ(θ) > 0 if and only if θ > θδ .
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fact that when consumers are unable to monetize their data as efficiently as the firm can,
they decrease the amount of data they monetize. As a result, the firm optimally decreases
low-value consumers’ usage to minimize the share of the surplus that the consumers ob-
tain.
It is also interesting to consider the firm’s profit-maximizing offer and consumers’
optimal data monetization policy when δ = 1. As we explained above, in this case con-
sumers can manage their data in the data market as well as the firm can.
COROLLARY 1. Suppose that consumers own the rights and δ = 1. Then, the firm’s profit and
consumer surplus are equal to those in the contractible data-extraction benchmark.
Although when consumers own the rights, the firm does not directly decide on the
data extraction, being a monopolist allows the firm to offer a contract that extracts as
much surplus as possible. In particular, when δ = 1 and consumers own the rights, each
consumer selects ex post to monetize as much data as is required to equate the marginal
value of data to the marginal cost of data. This is, however, precisely the amount of data
that the firm would decide to monetize had data extraction been contractible. Therefore,
the allocation that prevails is the same as that in the contractible data-extraction bench-
mark.
C. Optimal Allocation of Property Rights
In this subsection, we compare the profit and the consumer surplus under the two regimes.
Consider first the firm’s profit. We show in the appendix (see proof of Proposition
2) that, for any δ, (i) the firm’s profit is strictly increasing in α under any regime, and
(ii) the profit under the firm’s right regime increases faster in α than the profit under the
consumer’s right regime. Indeed, an increase in this value has dual impact. First, for a
given offer, it allows the firm to generate more value, either directly when it has the right
or indirectly by increasing the price paid by the consumers when they have the right.
Second, it leads the firm to change the offer proposed to the consumers and increase the
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amount of usage. These two effects are present under both ownership regimes. Nonethe-
less, in the consumer’s right regime, this impact is mitigated first by the monetization of
less data (consumers of type greater than θˆC do not monetize all their data) and second
by the lower value generated when all data is monetized (δ < 1). This implies that an
increase in the value of data is more profitable for the firm when the firm has the right
than when the consumers have the right.
We showed in Corollary 1 that when δ = 1, the firm’s profit is higher under the con-
sumers’ right regime for any value of data. As the ability of consumers to monetize their
data decreases (that is, as δ decreases), the return the firm indirectly obtains in the data
market when consumers have the right also decreases. In the extreme case in which δ = 0,
the consumers are unable to earn any monetary returns in the data market when they
have the right. This does not necessarily mean that the firm’s profit is always greater
when the firm has the rights than when consumers own the rights. Indeed, even if the
firm can gain by monetizing the data, it suffers from its inability to limit data exploitation.
The optimal ownership regime for the firm depends on the value of the data — that is,
the value of α. When the value of the data is high, the firm’s profit is higher when it owns
the rights, whereas when the value of the data is low, the firm’s profit is higher when
consumers own the rights.
We summarize the analysis in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. For any δ ≤ 1, there exists αF (δ) such that the firm’s profit is larger under
firm’s right if and only if α ≥ αF (δ), with αF (δ) increasing with δ and αF (1) = c.
A related result prevails for consumer surplus. Note first that since all value generated
in the market for data is captured by the firm, the consumer surplus depends only on how
much consumers are able to earn in the initial market. This surplus is increasing with the
consumption level, so consumer surplus is compared by comparing consumption levels
among the ownership regimes.
20
Similarly to the profit, we show in the appendix (see proof of Proposition 3) that (i)
the consumer surplus is strictly increasing in α under any regime and (ii) the consumer
surplus under the firm’s right regime increases faster in α than the consumer surplus
under the consumer’s right regime. The intuition is in line with that described above for
the profit. When the value of data increases, the firm is more likely to foster consumption,
which benefits consumers. However, this incentive depends on how much the firm can
capture in the market for data. When consumers have the rights, the benefits in this
market are lower (because δ < 1), so the firm has less incentive to foster consumption
than when it can fully exploit the data.
When δ = 1, the firm has the strongest incentive to subsidize consumers, and con-
sumer surplus is higher in the consumer’s right regime than in the firm’s right regime.
When δ = 0, the offer made by the firm depends on the value of the data, so consumers
are better off under consumer’s right if and only if this value is not too high. This trade-off
prevails as long as δ is not too large.
We summarize the analysis below.
PROPOSITION 3. For any δ, there is a threshold value of data αC(δ) such that consumer surplus
is larger under firm’s right when α ≤ αC(δ) with αC(δ) increasing and αC(1) = c.
For both the firm and consumers, the key element is the extent to which their inter-
action can generate some value. The higher the consumption in the primary market, the
more firms and consumers can gain. Each ownership regime is associated with a spe-
cific inefficiency: under-monetization of data when consumers have the right and over-
monetization when the firm has the right. When the value of data is low, maximal con-
sumption is guaranteed in the first regime, as it avoids any over-optimal use of data.
When the value of data is high, maximal consumption is guaranteed with the second
regime, as this avoids any under-optimal use of data.
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5 EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
A. Firm’s Right and Paying for Privacy
An alternative to transferring the rights to consumers is to allow the firm to offer an op-
tion such that the consumer pays for her privacy. Under such a regime, the firm owns the
rights and offers two goods: (i) a good that provides access only to the service (and hence
leaves the firm with all rights to any data generated) and (ii) a good that provides ac-
cess to the service but guarantees that any data generated by the interaction between the
firm and the consumers is not used in the future.15 In practical terms, platforms such as
YouTube usually offer versions of the same product: a free version that uses data to pro-
mote products to users through advertising and a premium version that is advertising-
free and therefore limits data collection.
As above, we focus without loss of generality on contracts (or direct revelation mech-
anisms) in which consumers report their type and a pre-defined price-usage-extraction
offer is implemented. Because the option for privacy is a binary decision, if consumers
do not choose the option, all the data they generate is indeed extracted and monetized.
Therefore, the option for privacy amounts to choosing e(θ) ∈ {0, q(θ)}. When e(θ) = q(θ),
the firm retains the right to use the data of type θ, which due to its inability to commit,
implies that it monetizes the data ex post; when e(θ) = 0, the firm gives up every right to
extract and monetize the data of type θ.
Let (t(·), q(·), e(·)) denote the offer made to consumers. The indirect utility of type θ
from truthfully announcing her type is
U(θ) = θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2− t(θ)− C(e(θ)) (11)
As in the benchmark, one can show that the mechanism is incentive compatible only if
15Akcura and Srinivasan (2005) propose a related analysis in which a monopolist can resell some informa-
tion and commit to doing so ex ante. Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015) analyze a competitive
version where the level of information disclosure differs among firms.
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usage is non-decreasing in θ and U˙(θ) = q(θ). The firm’s expected profit is
ΠP =
∫ 1
0
(
t(θ) +B(α, e(θ))
)
dθ,
which, by substituting (11) and re-arranging terms, is equal to
ΠP =
∫ 1
0
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2 +B(α, e(θ))− C(e(θ))
]
dθ (12)
Therefore, the objective of the firm is to find a usage schedule q(·) and a privacy offer e(·)
that maximize its profit (12) subject to the monotonicity (usage being non-decreasing) of
usage and feasibility constraints (q(θ) ≥ 0 and e(θ) ∈ {0, q(θ)} for every θ). This profit-
maximizing offer is described in the following lemma.
LEMMA 2. Suppose that the firm owns the rights and can propose that consumers pay for their
privacy. Then, there exists θˆP ∈ [θˆ∗, 1] such that the firm proposes a contract with usage q1(θ) and
full data monetization for θ ≤ θˆP and usage q0(θ) without data monetization for θ > θˆP .
Despite the option for privacy, inefficiencies still prevail in the data monetization pro-
cess. Indeed, to maximize the value generated, one should monetize all the data for rel-
atively low-value consumers but not all the data for relatively high-value consumers. In
particular, the firm’s inability to precisely fine-tune the data monetization leads the firm to
monetize more data than is optimal for some high-value consumers, namely, those whose
type is between θˆ and θˆP , and monetize no data for consumers whose type is greater than
θˆP .
The maximum profit the firm can earn under the option of paying for privacy is then
given by
ΠP =
∫ θˆP
θ1
(
(2θ − 1)q1(θ)− q21(θ)/2 +B(α, q1(θ))− C(q1(θ))
)
+
∫ 1
θˆP
(
(2θ − 1)q0(θ)− q20(θ)/2
)
dθ (13)
How does the option for privacy affect the firm’s profit and consumer surplus? By
construction, both the firm and consumers are better off relative to the regime in which
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the firm owns the rights but no option for privacy is available.16 The option for privacy
equips the firm with an additional contracting tool to mitigate its commitment problem.
This allows the firm to increase the price it charges. Regarding consumers, the option for
privacy allows higher usage and therefore a larger share of the generated surplus.
We now turn attention to the comparison between the regime in which the firm owns
the rights and can offer an option for privacy with the consumer’s right regime. As in
Section 4, this comparison depends on (i) how efficient consumers are when they directly
monetize their data (i.e., δ) and (ii) the value of data in the secondary market (i.e., α).
Consider first the two extreme cases in which either δ = 1 or δ = 0. We already pointed
out in Corollary 1 that, for δ = 1, the consumer’s right regime maximizes usage. This
implies that, in this case, for any α, the profit and consumer surplus are maximal when
consumers own the right. We further showed that, for δ = 0 and no option for privacy, the
consumer’s right regime yields higher profit and consumer surplus than the firm’s right
regime as long as α is sufficiently low. This is in contrast to the case in which an option
for privacy is available. In particular, when an option for privacy is available, the firm’s
profit and consumer surplus are higher under firm’s right than under consumer’s right
for any α. Intuitively, even if some inefficiencies prevail when the firm owns the right,
these inefficiencies are mitigated by the option for privacy.
When consumers can only imperfectly monetize their data (i.e., 0 < δ < 1), the trade-
off between the regime in which the firm owns the rights and can offer an option for
privacy and the regime in which consumers own the right is similar to that in Section
4. Indeed, one can show that the regime in which the firm owns the right and can offer
an option for privacy is optimal both for the firm and the consumers when α is suffi-
ciently high; whereas the regime in which consumers own the right is optimal when α
is sufficiently low. Nonetheless, the differentials in profits and consumer surplus are not
16Notably, the possibility for the firm to offer an option for privacy nests as a subcase of the case in which
no such option is available. Indeed, the firm can always refrain from offering any option for privacy, which
is equivalent to the case in which no option for privacy is available.
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monotonic in α. For sufficiently high α, it is still optimal to monetize the data directly by
the firm as it is the more efficient at doing so. However, when the value of data is small,
the paying-for-privacy regime is very similar to the regime in which the consumers have
the right, so the outcomes with both regimes are very similar. It is when the value of data
is “intermediate” that the cost of over-usage data is large enough so that the consumer’s
right regime is significantly better than the regime with paying-for-privacy.
The next proposition summarizes our discussion and results.
PROPOSITION 4. When firms can propose an option for privacy, this benefits both consumers and
firms. When consumers cannot monetize their data (δ = 0), the regime with paying-for-privacy is
optimal both for firms and consumers. When consumers can monetize their data (δ > 0),
1. there exists α˜C(δ) ≤ αˆC(δ) such that CSP ≥ CSC if and only if α > α˜C , with α˜C increas-
ing with δ,
2. there exists α˜F (δ) ≤ αˆF (δ) such that ΠP ≥ ΠC if and only if α > α˜F , with α˜F increasing
with δ,
B. Market for Data with a Uniform Price
In this subsection, we consider the case in which consumers own the rights but cannot
fine-tune the amount of data they sell; instead, they can sell either all their data at a
uniform price or no data at all. This is equivalent to allowing consumers to sell the right
to access their data rather than the precise data content. We suppose that the decision to
monetize the data is taken after the data is generated. Equivalently, one can assume that
consumers cannot commit to monetizing their data before purchasing the service.
As in the baseline model, we consider a competitive data market — that is, there are
many data brokers interested in purchasing the database. This implies that firms pur-
chasing the data (e.g., data brokers) earn zero profits. Let P denote the price at which
consumers sell their data. For any price P , the consumers who are willing to sell their
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data are those with a usage q(θ) such that P ≥ C(q(θ)). Let θˆM denote the cut-off type
such that P = C(q(θˆM)). We assume that only those consumers who have indeed pur-
chased the service can sell their data; consumers who do not purchase the service have
no data to sell.
As explained in Section 4, provided that the data is not processed by the firm that
generates it, the benefit that can be directly extracted is given by δB(α, q(θ)), where δ ≤ 1.
Let θM denote the cut-off type below which no type purchases the service. The zero-profit
condition in the market for data boils down to
P =
∫ θˆM
θM
δB(α, q(θ))
θˆM − θM
dθ (14)
To explain (14), note that P × (θˆM − θM) is the cost of purchasing the data at price P
from the share of consumers (θˆM − θM), whereas
∫ θˆM
θM
δB(α, q(θ))dθ is the benefit from
monetizing the data of those consumers.
We now turn our attention to the interaction between the firm and the consumers at
the first period. The utility of those consumers who anticipate selling their data on the
market (i.e., θ ≤ θˆM ) is equal to
U(θ) = θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2− t(θ) + P − C(q(θ)),
whereas the utility of those consumers who anticipate that they will not be active on the
market for data (i.e., θ ≤ θˆM ) is equal to
U(θ) = θq(θ)− q2(θ)/2− t(θ)
In both cases, to derive the optimal firm’s offer, we focus on direct revelation mechanisms.
The conditions for this offer to be incentive compatible are the same as above and given
by the conditions U˙(θ) = q(θ) and q(θ) increasing in θ. The firm’s profit can be written as
ΠM =
∫ θˆM
θM
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2 + P − C(q(θ))
]
dθ +
∫ 1
θˆM
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2
]
dθ
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which, by employing (14), boils down to
ΠM =
∫ θˆM
θM
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2 + δB(α, q(θ))− C(q(θ))
]
dθ
+
∫ 1
θˆM
[
(2θ − 1)q(θ)− q2(θ)/2
]
dθ (15)
Let us compare the profit in this regime with the profit in the consumer’s right regime
in which consumers can choose how much data to sell and therefore sell this data at a
personalized price. Since the market price is set at the average data value, the profit the
firm can make on the consumers that sell their data is the same as the profit obtained
in the standard regime with consumer’s right. By contrast, when consumers do not sell
their data on the market, no value is created, so the firm cannot retrieve any revenue
from these consumers. This implies that the profit is reduced in this regime relative to the
consumer’s right regime in which consumers can choose how much data to sell.
As far as consumers are concerned, the analysis slightly differs. Indeed, what matters
for consumer surplus is the extent to which the change from personalized price to a uni-
form price modifies the usage schedules offered by the firm. It turns out that, even if the
price proposed by the firm changes, there is no difference in the usage schedules between
the regimes with consumer’s right and the regime with uniform price. Indeed, by inspec-
tion of (15), one can see that the firm still offers qδ(θ) to low-type consumers who sell their
data and q0(θ) to high-type consumers who do not sell their data. Moreover, in spite of the
absence of data monetization for the high-type consumers, the cut-off type between the
two usage schedules, θˆM , is the same as that obtained in the standard regime with con-
sumer’s right, θˆC . Intuitively, even if consumers directly decide on whether they should
sell their data or not, the firm indirectly controls this decision through its offer (t(·), q(·)).
Therefore, the firm also implicitly selects the cut-off type θˆM to maximize its profit. Since
the value generated on the data market for the cut-off type is zero, as P = C(q(θˆM)), the
cut-off type is chosen such that the firm’s first-period profit is the same under both usage
schedules. This is precisely the profit-maximization condition in the consumer’s right
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regime studied in Section 4. Provided that the usage schedules in the consumer’s right
regime and the regime with uniform price are the same, the consumer surpluses in the
two regimes are also the same.
We summarize this discussion below.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that consumers can only sell all their data at a uniform price or no
data at all. Then, the firm’s profit is lower relative to the case in which consumers can select the
amount of data they can sell. By contrast, consumer surplus is the same in both cases.
6 CONCLUSION
When data is ubiquitous in the economy, the optimal allocation of rights over their ex-
ploitation seems paramount. We have shown that different allocations of rights have a
significant impact on the offers of firms and, as a consequence, firms’ profits and con-
sumer surplus. The optimal allocation of rights crucially depends on the relative weight
of the market in which the data are generated and the market in which they are used.
When the former is more important, consumers should own the rights to their data; when
the latter is more important, it may be welfare improving for firms to own the rights.
Our approach was developed under a set of assumptions. First, we assumed that
the firm in the primary market that trades with consumers and therefore generates — or
co-generates — data is a monopolist. It would be interesting to determine whether our
results hinge on this assumption, that is, how competition in the primary market affects
the optimal allocation of rights. On the one hand, competition would certainly restrict
firms’ ability to extract consumer surplus. On the other hand, it is at this stage rather
unclear whether this would encourage the allocation of rights to firms or consumers.
We also developed our model and analysis under the assumption that usage was con-
tractible, with the firm offering a tariff conditional on usage. Nonetheless, in many real-
world applications, firms set a subscription fee for the service, and consumers each freely
decide on their usage. This assumption on contractibility simplifies the analysis but is
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not crucial for our results. Perhaps a model in which firms could only set a subscription
fee would be better to explore questions related to the strategies of firms on the internet,
particularly in a competitive setting, and their consequences for consumers.
Finally, we assumed that the data generation process involved only two parties, one
firm and one consumer per transaction. However, it is common for data generation to in-
volve more than two parties. For example, in the automobile industry, car manufacturers
and software producers compete over the rights to use data on drivers’ behavior (see ).
In social media, information concerns groups rather than isolated individuals. Therefore,
the simple dichotomy between firm rights and consumer rights is not sufficient to study
optimal ownership. In a multi-firm or multi-agent environment, new challenges arise,
and thinking about the ownership of data is even more important for helping firms to
design their strategy.
A APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We know that for q < e¯∗, φ′(q) > 0, whereas for q ≥ e¯∗, φ′(q) = 0. Therefore, the question
is to examine when, indeed, q(θ) < e¯∗. Assuming that q(θ) < e¯∗, Eq. (5) yields an optimal
usage schedule equal to q1(θ), whereas assuming that q(θ) ≥ e¯∗, Eq. (5) yields an optimal
usage schedule q0(θ). Note however that q1(θ) < e¯∗ if and only if θ < θˆ∗. Therefore, the
optimal mechanism is such that q∗(θ) = e∗(θ) = q1(θ) for θ < θˆ∗ and q∗(θ) = q0(θ) ≥
e∗(θ) = e¯∗ for θ ≥ θˆ∗.
Q.E.D.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. We know that for q < e¯δ, φ′δ(q) > 0, whereas
for q ≥ e¯δ, φ′δ(q) = 0. The optimal usage schedule is found by point-wise maximization of
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(9). Assuming that q(θ) < e¯δ, the first-order condition yields
qδ(θ) = (2θ − 1 + δα)/(1 + c),
whereas, assuming that q(θ) ≥ e¯δ, the first-order condition yields q0(θ). Note however
that qδ(θ) < e¯δ if and only if θ < θˆC . Therefore the optimal usage schedule of type θ is
qδ(θ) for θ < θˆC and q0(θ) for θ ≥ θˆC .
Q.E.D.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this proposition is written for any distribution over [0, θ¯], with density f(·),
cdf F (·), such that h(θ) = (1−F (θ))/f(θ) decreases in θ (a quite standard property, called
MHRP, satisfied for most distribution functions), and assuming that α
c
≤ θ¯. Using a more
general proof illustrates that our results extend beyond the simple case of a uniform dis-
tribution over [0, 1]. It also makes some expressions more explicit and allows a better
understanding of some important equations.
Taking this more general perspective leads to q0(θ) = θ − h(θ), qδ(θ) = θ−h(θ)+δα1+c , and
q1(θ) =
θ−h(θ)+α
1+c
. Moreover, θ0 is characterized by q0(θ0) = 0, θδ such that qδ(θδ) = 0, and
θ1 such that q1(θ1) = 0.
We first consider the expression of the profit under firm’s right.
ΠF =
∫ θ¯
θ1
[
(θ − h(θ) + α)q1(θ)− (1 + c)q
2
1(θ)
2
]
f(θ)dθ
Using the envelope theorem, we get
dΠF
dα
=
∫ 1
θ1
q1(θ)f(θ)dθ.
We then study the profit under consumer’s right.
ΠC =
∫ θˆC
θδ
[
(θ−h(θ)+δα)qδ(θ)−(1+c)q
2
δ (θ)
2
]
f(θ)dθ+
∫ θ¯
θˆC
[
(2θ−1)q0(θ)−q
2
0(θ)
2
+φδ(e¯δ)
]
f(θ)dθ
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Let us see how the profits move with the value of data α.
dΠC
dα
=
dθˆC
dα
(1 + c)
q2δ (θˆC)
2
− dθδ
dα
(1 + c)
q2δ (θδ)
2
+
∫ θC
θδ
δqδ(θ)dθ
−dθˆC
dα
[q20(θˆC)
2
+ φδ(qδ(θˆC))
]
+
∫ 1
θˆC
dφδ(qδ(θˆC))
dα
dθ
Note first that q0(θˆC) = qδ(θˆC) = δαc and φδ(qδ(θˆC)) = c
q2δ (θˆC)
2
, so
(1 + c)
q2δ (θˆC)
2
=
q20(θˆC)
2
+ φδ(qδ(θˆC)) (16)
Moreover, dφδ(qδ(θˆC))
dδ
= αqδ(θˆC), so we get
dΠC
dα
=
∫ θˆC
θδ
δqδ(θ)f(θ)dθ + δqδ(θˆC)(1− F (θˆC)) ≥ 0 (17)
Since θδ ≥ θ1 and qδ(θ) ≤ q1(θ), it is direct to see that dΠCdα ≤ dΠFdα .
We compute the value of the profit for δ=1. In this case, θδ = θ1 and qδ(θ) = q1(θ) Using
the above expressions of the profit, with ∆Π = ΠF − ΠC we have that
∆Π =
∫ θ¯
θˆC
([
(θ − h(θ) + α)q1(θ)− (1 + c)q
2
1(θ)
2
]
−
[
(θ − h(θ))q0(θ)− q
2
0(θ)
2
+ φ(e¯∗)
])
f(θ)dθ
=
∫ θ¯
θˆC
([
(θ − h(θ))q1(θ)− q
2
1(θ)
2
+ αq1(θ)− cq
2
1(θ)
2
]
−
[
(θ − h(θ))q0(θ)− q
2
0(θ)
2
+ φ(e¯∗)
])
f(θ)dθ
We know that φ(e¯∗) = maxe αe− c e22 and that q0(θ) = arg maxq(θ − h(θ))q − q
2
2
. Therefore,
∆Π < 0 for δ = 1. Note that we can have ∆Π = 0 only when θˆC = θ¯, that is, when αc = θ.
We now look at the case where δ = 0. This means that φδ = 0. Note also that for θ ≤ θ0,
q0(θ) = 0. Therefore,
∆Π =
∫ θ0
θ1
[
(2θ − 1 + α)q1(θ)− (1 + c)q
2
1(θ)
2
]
dθ
+
∫ θ¯
θ0
([
(2θ − 1 + α)q1(θ)− (1 + c)q
2
1(θ)
2
]
−
[
(2θ − 1)q0(θ)− q
2
0(θ)
2
])
dθ
When α = 0, θ1 = θ0 and as q0(θ) = arg maxq(θ−h(θ))q− q
2
2
, then ∆Π < 0. Conversely,
when α
c
= θ¯, then θˆ∗ = θ¯, which means that it is optimal to monetize the data for all
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agents. This is exactly what the firm does when it has the right. Consequently, the firm’s
profit is larger in the firm’s right regime than in the consumer’s right regime.
Therefore, as ∆Π increases with α, there exists αF such that ∆Π ≥ 0 if and only if
α ≥ αF .
At last, it is direct to show that ΠC increases with δ or equivalently that ∆Π decreases
with δ. Indeed,
dΠC
dδ
=
dθˆC
dδ
(1 + c)
q2δ (θˆC)
2
f(θˆC)− dθδ
dδ
(1 + c)
q2δ (θδ)
2
f(θδ)
+
∫ θˆC
θδ
αqδ(θ)f(θ)dθ − dθˆC
dδ
[q20(θˆC)
2
+ φδ(qδ(θˆC))
]
f(θˆC) +
∫ θ¯
θˆC
dφδ(qδ(θˆC))
dδ
f(θ)dθ
Using Equation (16), qδ(θδ) = 0 and φδ(qδ(θˆC)) = c
q2δ (θˆC)
2
, we get
dΠC
dδ
=
∫ θˆC
θδ
αqδ(θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ¯
θˆC
αqδ(θˆC)f(θ)dθ ≥ 0. (18)
This implies that αˆF increases with δ. Indeed, we have shown that ∆Π increases with
α whereas it decreases with δ. As dαˆF
dδ
= − ∆pidδ∆pi
dδ
, it implies that αˆF will increase with δ.
Q.E.D.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
As we did for the previous proposition, we provide a proof of this proposition valid for
any distribution over [0, θ¯] such that the condition MHRP is satisfied.
The consumer surplus is given by the expected informational rents of consumers. So,
we have that
CSF =
∫ θ
θ1
q1(θ)(1− F (θ))dθ
and
CSC =
∫ θˆC
θδ
qδ(θ)(1− F (θ))dθ +
∫ θ
θˆC
q0(θ)(1− F (θ))dθ
Note first that,
dCSF
dα
=
∫ θ
θ1
dq1(θ)
dα
(1− F (θ))dθ
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which is positive because dq1(θ)
dα
= 1
1+c
> 0.
Moreover, using the fact that qδ(θˆC) = q0(θˆC), we obtain
dCSC
dα
=
∫ θˆC
θδ
dqδ(θ)
dα
(1− F (θ))dθ ≥ 0
which is also positive because dqδ(θ)
dα
= δ
1+c
> 0.
Since δ ≤ 1 and θ1 ≤ θδ ≤ θˆC ≤ θ, it implies that dCSFdα ≥ dCSCdα .
Moreover, CSF does not depend on δ whereas, using again that qδ(θˆC) = q0(θˆC),
dCSC
dδ
=
∫ θˆC
θδ
dqδ(θ)
dδ
(1− F (θ))dθ (19)
which is positive because dqδ(θ)
dδ
= α
1+c
> 0.
We first evaluate the consumer surplus for the extreme values α = 0 and α = c. For
α = 0, then θδ = θ1 = θˆC , and q1(θ) =
q0
1+c
, so
CSF |α=0 − CSC |α=0 =
∫ θ¯
θ0
q0(θ)(
1
1 + c
− 1)(1− F (θ))dθ
Provided that c > 0, the CSF |α=0 < CSC |α=0 for any δ.
Now, consider the consumer surplus under the two regimes for α
c
= θ. For δ < 1, then
q1(θ) > qδ(θ) for all θ and q1(θ) > q0(θ) for all θ < θ¯ and q1(θ) = q0(θ) for θ = θ¯. This
implies that CSF |α=c − CSC |α=c > 0. For δ = 1, then qδ = q1 and θδ = θ1 and θˆC = θ¯ so
CSF |α=c − CSC |α=c > 0.
Therefore, for δ = 1 and α < c, CSF < CSC . For any δ < 1, there exists αC(δ) such that
CSF < CSC if and only if α < αC(δ).
Using the previous relations, it is again direct to show that αC(δ) increases with δ with
αC(1) = c.
Q.E.D.
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E. Proof of Lemma 2
The firm’s objective can be split into two groups depending on whether agents opt for
privacy or not.
If a type θ does not opt for privacy, the profit of the firm from this consumer is the
same as under firm’s right. Therefore, the optimal usage is equal to q1(θ). The profit of
the firm from this consumer is given by the following.
We define
V1(θ) = (2θ − 1)q1(θ)− q
2
1(θ)
2
+ αq1(θ)− cq
2
1(θ)
2
, V0(θ) = (2θ − 1)q0(θ)− q
2
0(θ)
2
,
and
G(θ) = V1(θ)− V0(θ)
By the envelope theorem, the derivative of G(θ) with respect to θ is
G′(θ) = 2(q1(θ)− q0(θ)).
Because q1(θ) > q0(θ) for every θ < θˆ∗, there exists θˆP ∈ (θˆ∗, θ¯] such that G(θ) > 0 for
θ < θˆP and G(θ) ≤ 0 for θ ≥ θˆ. Therefore, the firm sets 1) e(θ) = q(θ) and q(θ) = q1(θ) for
every θ < θˆP and 2) e(θ) = 0 and q(θ) = q0(θ) for every θ ≥ θˆP .
We can characterize θˆP more precisely. Indeed, V1(θ) = (1 + c)
q21(θ)
2
and V0(θ)) =
q20(θ)
2
.
Since θˆC is such that V1(θˆP ) = V0(θˆP ), we get
(1 + c)
q21(θˆP )
2
=
q20(θˆP )
2
(20)
Since q1(θ) =
q0(θ)+α
1+c
for all θ, this leads to
q0(θˆP ) =
α
c
[1 +
√
1 + c]
Using the definition of q0(θ), we obtain θˆP = 12
(
1 + α
c
(1 +
√
1 + c)
)
Q.E.D.
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F. Proof of Proposition 4
We need to make two cases depending on whether θˆP < 1 or θˆP = 1
Let us first look at the case where θˆP = 1
This means that α ≥ c
[1+
√
1+c]
=
√
1 + c − 1. We are back to the analysis of the above
section since the production is q1 for every type and the data will be monetized for all
agents.
We now turn to the case where θˆP < 1⇔ α < (
√
1 + c− 1).
We first want to compare the profits. Under consumer’s right, the profit function is given
by
ΠC =
∫ θˆC
θδ
[
(2θ−1+ δα)qδ(θ)− q
2
δ (θ)
2
(1+ c)
]
dθ+
∫ 1
θˆC
[
(2θ−1))q0(θ)− q
2
0(θ)
2
+φδ(qδ(θˆC))
]
dθ
We already know (see Equation 18)) that the derivative with respect to δ is positive.
We define ∆Π = ΠP−ΠC . As ΠP does not depend on δ, it is direct to get that ∆Π decreases
with δ.
For δ = 1, we know that the profit value is maximized when consumers have the right,
so ∆Π ≤ 0. However, we can remark that when α = 0 and when α = c, ∆Π = 0. Indeed,
in the first case, no data is ever used, whereas in the second case, all the data is used in
both regimes for all types, so the profit values are the same.
For δ = 0, it is direct to see that ∆Π = 0 for α = 0 (no data is ever monetized in both
regimes), whereas ∆Π > 0 for α = c.
The profit in the PFP case is given by
ΠP =
∫ θˆP
θ1
[
(2θ − 1 + α)q1(θ)− q
2
1(θ)
2
(1 + c)
]
dθ +
∫ 1
θˆP
[
(2θ − 1)q0(θ)− q
2
0(θ)
2
]
dθ
So
dΠP
dα
=
dθˆP
dα
(1 + c)
q21(θˆP )
2
− dθ1
dα
(1 + c)
q21(θδ)
2
+
∫ θˆP
θ1
q1(θ)dθ − dθˆP
dα
q20(θˆP )
2
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We know that q1(θδ) = 0, and using Equation 20, we get
dΠP
dα
=
∫ θˆP
θ1
q1(θ)dθ (21)
Using Equation 17 for the derivative of ΠC with respect to α, we get directly
d∆Π
dα
=
∫ θˆP
θ1
q1(θ)dθ − δ
[ ∫ θC
θδ
qδ(θ)dθ + qδ(θˆC)(1− θˆC)
]
We also have
d2∆Π
dαdδ
= −
∫ θˆC
θδ
qδ(θ)dθ − δ
∫ θˆC
θδ
dqδ(θ)
dδ
dθ − 2qδ(θˆC)(1− θˆC) ≤ 0
and
d2∆Π
dα2
=
dθˆP
dα
q1(θˆP )− δ
2
c
(1− θˆC)
=
(1 +
√
1 + c)
2c
α
c
(1 +
√
1 + c
1 + c
)− δ
2
c
1
2
(
1− α
c
(1 +
√
1 + c)
)
When δ = 0, ∆Π is increasing in α, and since ∆Π = 0 when α = 0 (see above), the
profit is always larger in the PFP regime than in the consumers’ right regime.
When δ > 0, the derivative of ∆Π for α = 0 is zero, but the second derivative is
negative. Since d
2∆Π
dαdδ
≥ 0, for any δ, there exists α˜F such that the profit is larger under
paying-for-privacy than under the consumers’ right regime if and only if α ≥ α˜F . At last,
using the same argument than for α˜C , it is direct to show that α˜F is increasing in δ.
We now look at the comparison of consumer surplus. For this, we define by CSP and
CSC the consumer’s surplus in the paying-for-privacy and consumers’ right cases, re-
spectively.
CSP =
∫ θˆP
θ1
q1(θ)(1− θ)dθ +
∫ 1
θˆP
q0(θ)(1− θ)dθ (22)
and
CSC =
∫ θˆC
θδ
qδ(θ)(1− θ)dθ +
∫ 1
θˆC
q0(θ)(1− θ)dθ (23)
and let ∆CS be such that ∆CS = CSP − CSC .
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Note first that, when α = 0, θ1 = θˆP = θδ = θˆC , so ∆CS = 0 for all δ. If α = c, then θˆP = 1
so the production under paying for privacy is always larger than under consumers’ right
so ∆CS ≥ 0 (there is equality when θˆP = θˆC = 1, which happens when δ = 1).
Now, we want to compute d∆CS
dδ
and d∆CS
dα
. Note first that θ1 ≤ θδ < θˆC < θˆP ≤ 1. Then
we have
∆CS =
∫ θδ
θ1
q1(θ)(1− θ)dθ +
∫ θˆC
θδ
(
q1(θ)− qδ(θ)
)
(1− θ)dθ +
∫ θˆP
θˆC
(
q1(θ)− q0(θ)
)
(1− θ)dθ.
Since CSP does not depend on δ and using Equation (19), we get
d∆CS
dδ
= −dCSC
dδ
= −
∫ θˆC
θδ
dqδ(θ)
dδ
(1− θ)dθ ≤ 0.
We now look at the impact of α on ∆CS.
d∆CS
dα
=
dθδ
dα
q1(θδ)(1− θδ)−
dθ1
dα
q1(θ1)(1− θ1) +
∫ θˆ1
θ1
dqδ(θ)
dα
(1− θ)dθ
+
dθˆC
dα
[q1(θˆC)− qδ(θˆC)](1− θˆC)− dθδ
dα
[q1(θδ)− qδ(θδ)](1− θδ)
+
∫ θˆC
θδ
d(q1(θ)− qδ(θ))
dα
(1− θ)dθ
+
dθˆP
dα
[
q1(θˆP )− q0(θˆP )
]
(1− θˆP )− dθˆC
dα
[q1(θˆC)− q0(θˆC)](1− θˆC)
+
∫ θˆP
θC
d(q1(θ)− q0(θ))
dα
(1− θ)dθ.
Using the fact that q1(θ1) = qδ(θδ) = 0 and that qδ(θˆC) = q0(θˆC), we obtain
d∆CS
dα
=
∫ θˆδ
θ1
dq1(θ)
dα
(1− θ)dθ +
∫ θˆC
θδ
d(q1(θ)− qδ(θ))
dα
(1− θ)dθ
+
dθˆP
dα
[
q1(θˆP )− q0(θˆP )
]
(1− θˆP ) +
∫ θˆP
θC
d(q1(θ)− q0(θ))
dα
(1− θ)dθ.
Moreover, using the expression of the usage schedule, we have dq1
dα
(θ) = 1
1+c
,
d(q1(θ)−qδ(θ))
dα
= 1−δ
1+c
, dq0(θ)
dα
= 0, dθˆP
dα
= 1
2c
[1 +
√
1 + c], and q1(θˆP ) − q0(θˆP ) = −α
√
1+c
1+c
.
37
So
d∆CS
dα
=
∫ θˆδ
θ1
(1− θ)
1 + c
dθ +
∫ θˆC
θδ
(1− δ)(1− θ)
1 + c
dα(1− θ)dθ
−α
√
1 + c
1 + c
[1 +
√
1 + c]
2c
(1− θˆP ) +
∫ θˆP
θC
(1− θ)
1 + c
dθ.
This leads to
d∆CS
dα
=
α
4c
[
(1 +
√
1 + c)2
α
2c
− δ2
(
1 +
α
2c
δ(c− 1)
)]
=
α
4c
[ α
2c
(
(1 +
√
1 + c)2 − δ3(c− 1)
)
− δ2
]
.
It is direct to see that
1. For δ = 0, d∆CS
dα
≥ 0.
2. For α = 0, d∆CS
dα
= 0.
3. Let A = (1 +
√
1 + c)2 − δ3(c − 1). Since δ ≤ 1, then A ≥ 0 and d∆CS
dα
≥⇔ α
2c
A ≥ δ2.
So for any δ > 0, there exists αˆ(δ) such that d∆CS
dα
> 0 if and only if α > αˆ(δ).
For any δ > 0, ∆CS = 0 for α = 0, so ∆CS(α) is negative when α is small and then
positive for large α. Since for δ = 1 and α = c, we have ∆CS = 0 and then ∆CS decreases
with δ, for any δ there exists α˜C such that ∆CS ≥ 0 for α ≥ α˜C .
At last, we can discuss the properties of this threshold α˜C . We already know that
α˜C = 0 for δ = 0 and α˜C = c for δ = 1. When θˆP = 1, i.e., when α ≥ (
√
1 + c − 1), then
CSP = CSF , so the threshold is the same as in section (4), α˜C = αˆC . When θˆP < 1, then
CSP > CSF , so α˜C ≤ αˆC . At last, since ∆CS is increasing with α when ∆CS = 0 for α > 0
and ∆CS is decreasing with δ, then α˜C increases with δ.
Q.E.D.
G. Proof of Proposition 5
Note first that the usage schedules, qδ(θ) and q0(θ), are the solutions of the point-wise
maximization of (15). Then, to derive the threshold θˆM , one should note the profit function
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taking P as given. Using then the fact that q(θ) = qδ(θ) for θ ≤ θˆM and q(θ) = q0(θ) for
θ > θˆM , the first-order condition to maximize the profit with respect to θˆM leads to(
(2θˆM − 1)qδ(θˆM)− q2δ (θˆM)/2 + P − C(qδ(θˆM))
)
−
(
(2θˆM − 1)q0(θˆM)− q20(θˆM)/2
)
= 0
Since P = C(qδ(θˆM)), we obtain at equilibrium(
(2θˆM − 1)qδ(θˆM)− q2δ (θˆM)/2
)
−
(
(2θˆM − 1)q0(θˆM)− q20(θˆM)/2
)
= 0⇒ qδ(θˆM) = q20(θˆM)
This condition is similar to the one characterizing θˆC , which here means that θˆM = θˆC .
Since the usage schedules are the same in the regime with consumer’s right and with a
market with uniform price, the consumer surplus is the same in both regimes.
Q.E.D.
REFERENCES
Acquisti, Alessandro, “Ubiquitous Computing, Customer Tracking, and Price Discrimi-
nation,” in Ubiquitous and Pervasive Commerce (Springer, 2006).
Acquisti, Alessandro, Curtis Taylor, and Liad Wagman, “The Economics of Privacy,” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 54 (2016), 442–92.
Acquisti, Alessandro, and Hal R Varian, “Conditioning prices on purchase history,” Mar-
keting Science, 24 (2005), 367–381.
Agrawal, Ajay, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb, Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics
of Artificial Intelligence (Harvard Business Review Press, 2018).
Akcura, Tolga, and Kannan Srinivasan, “Customer Intimacy and Cross-Selling Strategy,”
Management Science, 51 (2005), 1007–1012.
Amelio, Andrea, and Bruno Jullien, “Tying and Feebies in Two-Sided Markets,” Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (2012), 436–446.
39
Armstrong, Mark, “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” The RAND Journal of Economics,
37 (2006), 668–691.
Berinato, Scott, “With big data comes big responsibility,” Harvard Business Review, 92
(2014), 20.
Caillaud, Bernard, and Bruno Jullien, “Chicken & egg: Competition among intermedia-
tion service providers,” RAND journal of Economics, 34 (2003), 309–328.
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Andres Hervas-Drane, “Competing with Privacy,”
Management Science, 61 (2015), 229–256.
Chakravorti, Bhaskar, “Why It’s So Hard for Users to Control Their Data.” Harvard Busi-
ness Review Digital Articles, (2020), 2 – 6, available at: http://search.ebscohost.com.
ezp.essec.fr/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=141655838&site=bsi-live.
Coase, Ronald H, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1960),
1–44.
Dasgupta, Partha, Peter Hammond, and Eric Maskin, “The Implementation of Social
Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility,” The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 46 (1979), 185–216.
Duch-Brown, Nestor, Bertin Martens, and Frank Mueller-Langer, “The Economics of
Ownership, Access and Trade in Digital Data,” JRC Digital Economy Working Paper 2017-
01, (2017), available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2914144.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole, “Customer Poaching and Brand Switching,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 31 (2000), 634–657.
Fudenberg, Drew, and J Miguel Villas-Boas, “Price Discrimination in the Digital Econ-
omy,” The Oxford handbook of the digital economy, (2012), 254.
40
Grossman, Sanford J, and Oliver D Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), 691–719.
Hagel III, John, and Jeffrey F Rayport, “The coming battle for customer information,” The
McKinsey Quarterly, (1997), 64.
Hermalin, Benjamin E, and Michael L Katz, “Privacy, Property Rights and Efficiency: The
Economics of Privacy as Secrecy,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 4 (2006), 209–
239.
Jones, Charles, and Christopher Tonetti, “Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data,” Papers,
Society for Economic Dynamics, (2018).
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent
Model (Princeton University Press, 2002).
Laudon, Kenneth C, “Markets and privacy,” Communications of the ACM, 39 (1996), 92–
104.
Ritter, Jeffrey, and Anna Mayer, “Regulating Data as Property,” Duke Law & Technology
Review, 16 (2017), 220–277.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (2003), 990–1029.
Westin, Alan, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum Publishers., 1967).
41
